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Todd F. Bovo
Defendant Pro Se
300 West 745 South
Orem, Utah 84058
(801)427-2717

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
TODD BOVO
Appellant,
Vs.
CITY OF OREM
Appellee

Case No. 20020673
:

Priority No. 2

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant, TODD BOVO, appeals from a bench verdict of guilty of
two misdemeanor charges, class A, and class B. The trial was held in front
of the Honorable John Backlund, Judge, Fourth District Court, State of Utah,
Utah County, City of Orem Department. The verdict of guilt was entered by
the court on July 19, 2002 and the defendant was sentenced to 6 months in
jail suspended, and probation by the court for one year. The defendant was
ordered to pay 1750 dollars of which 1493 dollars was suspended. The
Appellant filed his notice of appeal in a timely fashion. The Utah Court of
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Appeals has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3 (e).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the court commit error as a matter of law by a denying the

defendant's request for a jury trial, when the defendant motioned before the
court at the arraignment?
Standard of Review: The trial court's conclusions of law are
reviewed for correctness. U.R.C.P. 17(d), Utah Code §77-1-6. State v.
Cook. 714 P2d. 296 (1986).
Citation to Record: Arraignment transcript,p.5-p.6,17, bench
trial transcript,p.8,6-13.

2.

Did the court commit error in dismissing Officer Healy, the arresting

officer, prior to allowing Mr. Bovo the opportunity to be confronted by the
witnesses against him?
Standard of Review: The standard of review is abuse of
discretion. U.S.C.A. Sixth Amendment, Utah Code 77-1-6, Utah Rule of
Evidence 605.
Citation to Record: Bench trial transcript, p.73,10- p.76,17.
3.

Did the trial judge understand the laws that apply in this case?
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Standard of Review: The standard of review is a question of
law so the appellate court is to give no deference to the trial judge and apply
a correction of error standard. State v. Jensen 351 N. W. 2d 29 (Minn. App
1984), U.C.C.P. 77-7-2, Utah Code Ann. 76-9-102(3), Utah Code 77-17-3
Citation to Record: Bench trial transcript, p. 104,10-25, p.33,
15-21, p.38, 17-18, p.68, 19.

4.

Did the trial judge commit error when he based his ruling on the

testimony that the judge himself had provided in behalf of the witness,
Officer Healy?
Standard of Review: The standard of review is abuse of
discretion. Utah Rule of Evidence 605.
Citation to Record: Bench trial transcript p.51, 8-18, p.73,2124, p. 106, 8-12.

5.

Was the trial judge biased towards the defendant in open court which

affected his constitutional right to due process and a fair trial? When the
defendant was cut off, or when the prosecutor was allowed to object at will,
were the rights of Mr. Bovo compromised?
Standard of Review: Sixth Amendment U.S.C.A, Utah Rule of
Evidence 607.
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Citation to Record: Bench trial transcript p.64,14-p.65,l, p. 103,
20-33, p. 104, 20-25.

6.

Did the trial court commit error in dismissing the motion to suppress

statements under Miranda 18 USCS §3501?
Standard of Review: Miranda v. Arizona 344 U.S. 436, (1996) U.S.C.A. §3501(c), U.C.A. 76-8-508 (2).
Citation to Record: Bench trial transcript p.63,8-15.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Bovo appeals from a judgment and conviction imposed for
disorderly conduct, a class C misdemeanor, and reckless driving, a class B
misdemeanor. Mr. Bovo was originally charged in an Information filed on
May 5,2002. On June 13,2002 Mr. Bovo moved to receive a jury trial
pursuant to rule Utah Code Ann.§ 77-1-6 and Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure 17(c)-(d). The judge hearing the case denied the motion in
stating, "I haven't put anybody in jail for reckless driving in 18 years... So
this would be tried as if they were both infractions, then" (arraignment p. 5
21.22) The defendant again motioned by stating, "my sixth amendment
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right in all criminal prosecutions is to enjoy the right of a speedy trial and an
impartial jury"(arraignment p.6,7.8). The Judge responded by saying,
"thank you very much. I appreciate you reminding me of the Bill of Rights,
thank you (arraignment p.6, 9.10).. .Case law has held in interpreting the
Sixth Amendment that if there's no jeopardy of going to jail, even if
convicted, then the right to a jury trial does not apply. Thank
you"(arraignment p.6,13-16).
On July 2,2002 Mr. Bovo moved the court to dismiss the charges
based on the insufficient evidence in the case. Mr. Bovo argued that the
officers' actions violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 14 of
the Utah Constitution. The Motion to Dismiss came before the Honorable
John Backlund. The Orem City Prosecutor filed a Memorandum in
Opposition to Mr. Bovo's Motion to Dismiss on July 15,2002. Mr. Bovo
did not receive notification of the Judge's ruling on the Motion to Dismiss
prior to the trial, or after the trial. At the trial, Judge Backlund reported that
the motion was denied (trial transcript p. 7,4-5.) The case was tried to a
bench trial on July 19, 2002. See Bench Trial Transcript. Mr. Bovo was
convicted as charged and sentenced on July 19,2002 to 6 months jail all of
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which suspended, a fine of $1750 of which $1493 was suspended. Mr. Bovo
filed a timely notice of appeal on August 19, 2002.

STATEMENTS OF FACTS

On April 6, 2002 at approximately 18:45 Ms. Margie Call was driving
eastbound on 800 South in Orem (transcript p. 10,17). Mr. Todd Bovo was
driving behind Ms. Call, for a distance of which she estimated was "
approximately three or four blocks" (transcript p. 23,17-18). Ms. Call
stated, "I was going 30 miles an hour, so that's how I recall exactly how fast
I was going."(transcript p. 16,4-11). Ms Call reported that Mr. Bovo
attempted to pass her on the left and on the right and was tailgating her
(transcript p. 11,1.24). Mr. Bovo headed north on State Street and was
stopped on 100 North State Street by Officer Bingham who did not witness
any moving violations, safety violations, or expired registration on the
vehicle (transcript p.62, 9-19). He stated, "I found that your driver's
license was valid (transcript p.61, 23)...I believe the registration was valid...
I know we did not take any action on those things (transcript p.62, 3).
Officer Bingham effected a traffic stop based on a report from Ms. Call who
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was following Mr. Bovo, his stop was based on that articulable suspicion
supplied by Ms. Call (transcript p.63,1 -4). While stopped, Mr. Bovo was
told to exit the vehicle and produce his driver's license, proof of insurance,
and vehicle registration, which he did produce (transcript p.60,15-19).
During the course of the interrogation Ms. Call reported that she didn't hear
the words but she witnessed Mr. Bovo mouth the words "You're going to
pay (transcript p.33,15-21). Ms. Lenhardt (identified as- THE WITNESS
in the trial transcript was the passenger in Ms. Margie Call's vehicle)
testified in court that "he mouthed the words, "YouMl pay" (transcript p.38,
17-18). Officer Bingham was asked if he witnessed the threat he replied,
"no, not a word. Nope" (transcript p. 68, 19). Officer Healy did not testify.
Mr. Bovo was then placed under arrest by Officer Healy and charged with
Disorderly Conduct and Reckless Driving.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Issue I:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF
LAW BY NOT GRANTING MR. BOVO A JURY
TRIAL BASED ON HIS MOTION BEFORE THE
COURT DURING THE ARRAIGNMENT, THE
ORIGINAL CHARGES WERE NOT AMMENDED
TO INFRACTIONS AS THE JUDGE SAID THEY
WOULD BE.
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Not allowing appellant to be tried by a jury the court abused its
discretion. Appellant made the request for a jury trial at the arraignment and
his motion was wrongfully denied. Appellant was pro se defendant.
Issue II:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
OFFICER HEALY, THE ARRESTING OFFICER,
PRIOR TO ALLOWING MR. BOVO THE
OPPORTUNITY TO BE CONFRONTED BY THE
WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.

The trial court erred in dismissing Officer Healy, the arresting officer.
The Information given to appellant at the arraignment was based on
evidence obtained from Officer Healy. His knowledge was the cause of the
charges being filed. Officer Healy was present in Court during the trial.
Appellant made several requests to question the officer. The trial judge
denied the requests and excused the officer.
Issue III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL
JUDGE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE LAW.
FURTHERMORE. THE EVIDENCE OF THE CASE IS
INSUFFICIENT TO FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY
AS CHARGED.

The trial court erred because the trial judge did not understand that an
officer must be present and witness a Misdemeanor Class B or C to effect an
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arrest. Furthermore, the evidence brought forth was insufficient to find the
defendant guilty as charged.
Issue IV

THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED WHEN HE BASED HIS
RULING ON THE TESTIMONY THAT THE JUDGE
HIMSELF HAD PROVIDED IN BEHALF OF THE
EXCUSED WITNESS, OFFICER HEALY.

The trial court erred when the trial judge based his ruling and the
sentence that he imposed on Appellant on the testimony that the Judge
provided in behalf of the witnesses he excused.
Issue V

THE TRIAL JUDGE EXPRESSED BIAS AND
PREJUDICE TOWARDS THE DEFENDANT IN OPEN
COURT THAT SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTED HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND A
FAIR TRIAL. THE JUDGE REPEATEDLY CUT OFF
THE DEFENDANT, ALLOWED THE PROCECUTOR
TO OBJECT AT WILL. AND DENIED MR. BOVO'S
LINE OF QUESTIONING FOR NO APPARENT
REASON. DENYING MR. BOVO THE OPPORTUNITY
TO STATE HIS CASE.

The trial judge denied the opportunity for Appellant to state his case.
Appellant was denied his line of questioning, cut-off by the trial judge, and
not given grounds for the denials. This severely affected his right of due
process.
Issue VI

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
MOTION TO SUPRESS STATEMENTS UNDER
MIRANDA 18 USCS $3501.
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In Appellant's pre-trial motion to suppress evidence the trial judge
denied his request. Appellant was detained and interrogated by the officers
which created a hostile environment. While being detained, the officers
reported another crime which allegedly occurred during that detainment.

ARGUMENT
Issue I:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
BY NOT GRANTING MR. BOVO A JURY TRIAL
BASED ON HIS MOTION BEFORE THE COURT
DURING THE ARRAIGNMENT. THE ORIGINAL
CHARGES WERE NOT AMMENDED TO
INFRACTIONS AS THE JUDGE SAID THEY WOULD
BE.

The evidence addressing what Mr. Bovo said concerning his request
for a jury trial at the time of the arraignment.
MR. BOVO: Your Honor, I'd also request a trial by jury.
THE COURT: This isn't going to be tried to a jury, because you're not in
any jeopardy of going to jail even if you're convicted, Mr. Bovo.
MR. BOVO: There's 90 days in jail.
(actually 6 months and 90 days according to the charges)
THE COURT: I know it's a possibility, but I haven't put anybody in jail for
reckless driving in 18 years.
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MR. BOVO: Right.
THE COURT: You're not in any jeopardy of going to jail. If the city wants
to—do you want to put any statement on about the possibility of seeking any
jail time?
MR. CHURCH: (inaudible) I don't think that that's (inaudible).
THE COURT: So this would be tried as if they were both infractions, then?
MR. BOVO: Well, my Sixth Amendment right in all criminal prosecutions
is to enjoy the right of a speedy trial and an impartial jury.
THE COURT: Thank you very much. I appreciate you reminding me of the
Bill of Rights, thank you.
MR. BOVO: So I do not have the ability to be tried by a jury?
THE COURT: Case law has held in interpreting the Sixth Amendment that
if there's no jeopardy of going to jail, even if convicted, then the right to a
jury trial does not apply. Thank you.
MR. BOVO: Thank you, your Honor.
(See arraignment transcript p.5- p.6, 17)
The trial court's ruling to dismiss the motion to a jury trial was based
on Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 17 (d). "No jury shall be allowed in
the trial of an infraction." The trial court ruled that both charges be amended
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to infractions so as to comply with the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
However, at the trial Mr. Bovo was tried on two misdemeanor charges. The
trial began without notice of the amended charges, therefore the original
charges were not amended and Mr. Bovo was charged without notice. The
trial court found Mr. Bovo guilty of Class B misdemeanor and, and guilty of
infraction, the lesser charge of Class C misdemeanor.
As stated in the record it cannot be ignored that Mr. Bovo wanted to
be tried by a jury. At the beginning of the trial, Mr. Bovo again made a
request for a jury trial. The trial court denied the motion ever existed.
MR. BOVO: I was told that I was not to receive a jury. I was denied the
right to a trial.
THE COURT: Well, no one has ever requested a jury in this case.
MR. BOVO: I did, I requested it.
(see trial p.8,6-13).
The issue at hand was whether or not the motion in open court at the
arraignment complies with U.R.C.P 17 (d).
(A) A jury trial shall not be allowed in the case of infraction.
Mr. Bovo requested a jury trial, but the trial court denied the request
on the assumption that the violations would be changed to infractions and
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not misdemeanors. The court and the prosecutor never amended the charges
to infractions and therefore erred in providing reasonable grounds for the
denial of the jury trial. Thefinaljudgment rendered by the court found him
guilty of Class B misdemeanor. Mr. Bovo was entitled to a jury trial and
the denial of this right is prejudicial error, requiring reversal.
In the case of West Valley City v. McDonald, 948 P2d. 371 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997), the defendant was denied a jury trial when the defendant was
originally charged with a class C Misdemeanor. The distinction between
McDonald and the case at hand is that in McDonald, the prosecutor amended
the charge against the defendant to an infraction. Thus, not providing the
defendant a jury did comply with U.R.C.P. If the prosecutor had amended
the charges against Mr. Bovo, he should have been fairly denied a jury trial,
but that is simply not the case.

(B) Mr. Bovo motioned for a jury trial.
There is nothing in the record before the trial court to show that
defendant's statutory right was properly waived by the defendant. No
waiver of a jury was ever made by defendant in open court or on the record.
A criminal defendant's right to a jury trial is substantial and valuable and
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should be carefully safeguarded by the court. Utah Const, art. I, § 12;
Duncan. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58,88 S.Ct 1444, 1451-52, 20
L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); see also State v. Studham, Utah 655 P.2d 669 (1982). It
is of no saving consequence that the prosecution was unable to prove one of
the misdemeanor charges, resulting in defendant's conviction of only the
infraction. Had Mr. Bovo been tried before a jury, the prosecution's failure
to prove the offense charged might have resulted in an acquittal. Mr. Bovo
asserts that the trial court's denial of his demand for jury trial deprived him
of that basic constitutional right. Article III, section 2, clause 3, of the
United States Constitution provides that "the Trial of all Crimes, except in
Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury." And the Sixth Amendment
guarantees that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." The Supreme Court
has made the Sixth Amendment guarantee of arightof a jury trial obligatory
on the states by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444 20 L.Ed.2d 491, reh'g
denied, 392 U.S. 947, 88 S.Ct. 2270,20 L.Ed.2d 1412 (1968).
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In City of Pasco v. Deloy E. Mace, 98 Wash.2d 87 (Supreme Court of
Washington 1982), no offense can be deemed so petty as to warrant denying
a jury if it constitutes a crime.

(C) No written demand for a jury trial was made before the court.
It was futile for Mr. Bovo to file a written demand to the court
pursuant to U.R.C.P 17(d) because the court had ordered otherwise. The
rule states, "All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant
makes written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders
otherwise." The court had already made its ruling on the matter at the
arraignment. The decision was explicit and absolute to indicate no jury trial.
At the arraignment, the trial court did not state that the demand did not
comply with U.R.C.P., the trial court simply ruled NO JURY TRIAL. In
State of Utah v. Dale Stevens, 718 P.2d 398 (Supreme Court of Utah),
defendant having made a timely demand, defendant was entitled to a jury
trial, U.C.A., 1953 §77-35-17(d) (1982 ED.): The trial court did not offer
any legitimate justification for having deprived Mr. Bovo his statutory right
to a jury trial. Mr. Bovo had a right to jury trial, he asked for one, and it was
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denied. This is particularly important because Mr. Bovo was proceeding
without counsel. Even in the absence of an adequate brief the refusal to
impanel a jury trial was a reversible error. See State v. Cook, Utah, 714
P2d.296 (1986). The court not only denied Mr. Bovo the right to a jury trial,
but the trial judge then criticized Mr. Bovo by saying, " Thank you very
much. I appreciate you reminding me of the Bill of Rights, thank you."
Was it not enough to deny the jury request? Did the trial judge need to make
that remark while in effect denying the defendant his civil rights according
to the Bill of Rights? Mr. Bovo was charged with Class B, misdemeanor,
and Class C misdemeanor. The maximum jail penalty associated with those
charges according to Utah law is six months and ninety days. A sentence of
six months and ninety days is not defined by as a petty crime according to
the United States Supreme Court and the U.R.C.P. The primary purpose of a
jury is to serve as a check against arbitrary or vindictive law enforcement.
Section 77-1-6 is clear and unambiguous: pursuant to this section, the
trial court need only determine (1) that the defendant is charged with a crime
other than an infraction; (2) that the defendant has complied with Rule 17
by making a demand for a jury trial, or was ruled otherwise; and (3) that the
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defendant has not waived the right to a jury trial. See Utah Code Ann. § 771-6.

Issue II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING OFFICER
HEALY. THE ARRESTING OFFICER. PRIOR TO
ALLOWING MR. BOVO THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE
CONFRONTED BY THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.

Officer Healy was the arresting officer as listed in the charges filed
against Mr. Bovo. His report was the basis for the charges. Officer Healy
was present in the court room on the day of the trial. He was subpoenaed by
the Mr. Church, the prosecuting attorney. Officer Healy did not testify in
any other trial that day. Following the testimony of one of the prosecutor's
witness, who was at the scene but did not effect the arrest, the conversation
transpired at the trial;
THE COURT: Thank you, you may step down. Is it really necessary to call
Officer Healy? I mean, if he's going to add something, fine. If it's just a
reiteration of the same—
MS. JENSEN: We'll keep it for rebuttal.
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THE COURT: The Court finds the City has rested, then. We have two de
novo matters set for 11:30, it's now 20 minutes past. I'm going to excuse
Officer Healy. There's no reason for rebuttal in this kind of case.
MR. CHURCH: Ms. Jensen has informed me the only additional testimony
would be—well, go ahead.
MS. JENSEN: That Officer Healy asked the defendant for a driver's license
and he said he didn't have one, but then he later produced it. So that's all.
THE COURT: Well, I'll excuse both officers, then.
MR. BOVO: Can I question the officers?
THE COURT: Question which officer?
MR. BOVO: Officer Healy.
THE COURT: They're not calling him. He's not going to be on the stand.
We're going to do the two de novo hearings now, and as soon as we're done
with those we'll come back to this case. I assume Mr. Bovo and his brother
want to testify, so the parties can just remain available. I'll assume that will
be in one half hour then.
MR. BOVO: Your Honor, I don't have the opportunity to question Officer
Healy?
THE COURT: They're not calling him?
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MR. BOVO: Can I call him?
THE COURT: You want to call Officer Healy?
MR. BOVO: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: Why?
MR. BOVO: Because I have very—because he was the arresting officer.
THE COURT: Did Officer Healy see or hear the threatening of the victim in
this case?
MR. BOVO: He has a very much different—he has a completely different
report than—
THE COURT: He hasn't claimed that he heard you mouth the words,
"You're going to pay." He didn't see you flip the bird. That's the basis for
the disorderly conduct charge. He didn't see any of the driving pattern I just
don't think it's relevant.
MR. BOVO: He was the arresting officer. His report varies considerably to
that of Officer Bingham.
THE COURT: Okay. Does Officer Healy claim that he heard or saw the
defendant mouth or say the words, "You're going to pay?"
MR. CHURCH: No, he doesn't, your Honor.
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THE COURT: Or that he saw the defendant do an obscene gesture with his
hand towards the complainant?
MR. CHURCH: No, he doesn't.
THE COURT: Okay, that's what the disorderly conduct charge is all about.
MR. BOVO: He also testified as to the reckless driving.
THE COURT: Well, he wasn't there for the reckless driving.
MR. BOVO: I know.
THE COURT: He didn't see it. The only people that were there were you,
your brother, and the other occupant, and this young lady and her mother.
I've heard their testimony, and I'll hear your testimony.
MR. BOVO: As the arresting officer he's the primary witness in my case.
THE COURT: No he's not. He didn't see it. He effected the arrest based
on a citizen complaint. All right, we're going to be in recess. We'll do the
two de novo matters and then we'll come back to this case.
You just want a chance to have him on the stand so you can argue with him,
and you know what, Mr. Bovo, the City is not presenting you with that
opportunity. All right, we're in recess on this case until we reconvene,
(trial adjourned while other matters heard.)
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THE COURT: And we'll reconvene on the matter of the city of Orem
versus Todd Frank Bovo. The City has rested.
MR. CHURCH: Actually, your Honor, Officer Healy wanted me to inform
the court that if he were subpoenaed if needed he would come back.
THE COURT: He would come back?
MR. CHURCH: Yes.
(Bench trial transcript, p.73,10- p.76,17.)
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 605 states: "The judge presiding at the
trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. No objection need be made in
order to preserve the point." Clearly the judge testified for multiple people a
number on a number of different occasions.
Furthermore, the trial court erred by dismissing Officer Healy despite
multiple requests by Mr. Bovo to question Officer Healy. Denial of
defendant's requests violates the following rules:
Sixth Amendment U.S.C.A. provides that a person accused of a crime
has the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." This Sixth
Amendment right is applicable to state court proceedings through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas. 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct 1065,1069
13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965). The primary object of the confrontation was—to
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prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted
in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal
examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has
an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience
of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in
order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand
and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of
belief Mattox v. United States. 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 339, 39
L.Ed. 409 (1985). The rights guaranteed under the Confrontation Clause
include the right to have the witness physically present, to have that
testimony offered under oath and subject to cross examination, and to
provide the tier of fact with an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witness. Craig. 497 U.S. at 845-46, 110 S.Ct. at 3163. The primary interest
secured by the Confrontation Clause, however, is the right of crossexamination, '"the principal means by which the believability of a witness
and the truth of his testimony are tested.'" Kentucky v. Stincer. 482 U.S. 730,
736, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2662 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987). The Court in Stincer
called cross-examination the '"greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth,'" 482 U.S. at 736,107 S.Ct. at 2662. A defendant has
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the right, under the Sixth Amendment, to demand the physical presence, at
trial, of accusatory witnesses. This preferred right of physical presence, or
"face-to-face" confrontation, may be dispensed with only where denial of
such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and
only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured. Craig, 497
U.S. at 850,110 S.Ctat 3166.
This case is particularlyfrustratingfor Mr. Bovo because of multiple,
blatant errors made by the trial judge. Even when the prosecutor told the
judge that they would keep the witness for rebuttal the judge said, "There's
no reason for rebuttal in this kind of case" (trial p. 73,18). What did the
Judge intend by "this kind of case?" A Pro Se case. He had already denied
every motion or request by Mr. Bovo and didn't seem to want to hear much
of anything, let alone another witness. Officer Healy went out of his way
and approached the city Prosecutor to tell him of his willingness to testify
and that he would come back again if subpoenaed (trial p.76, 13-15). But
that was not the end of it. The trial Judge then asked the Prosecutor Mr.
Church to testify in behalf of Officer Healy, (see trial p.75, 5-11). Finally,
the trial Judge testified in behalf of Mr. Bovo, and Officer Healy. Mr. Bovo
said that the Officer was the primary witness in his case. Judge Backlund
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responded, "No, he's not. He didn't see it. He effected the arrest based on a
citizen complaint

You just want a chance to have him on the stand so you

can argue with him. And you know what Mr. Bovo, the City is not
presenting you with that opportunity (trial p.75, 25-p.76,l-9). Again the trial
judge violated Rule 605 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Although pro se
defendants do not fully understand court procedures, the record will show
that Mr. Bovo did not abuse his rights in the courtroom. He questioned the
witnesses quickly with pertinent questions to the case. For those reasons it
is even more disheartening that the trial judge abused his discretion and took
advantage of the rights of a pro se defendant, by denying confrontation of
the witness and in testifying in behalf of the witness and Mr. Bovo.

Issue III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL
JUDGE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE LAW.
FURTHERMORE. THE EVIDENCE OF THE CASE IS
INSUFFICIENT TO FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY
AS CHARGED.

The trial court erred based on the following.
THE COURT: Well, I understand that. You seem to be saying that a person
can commit any misdemeanor that they want to in this world, as long as
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there's not an officer standing right there and witnessing it and they can
never be arrested. Does that make sense to you?
MR. BOVO: I'm saying they can be cited.
THE COURT: It doesn't make sense to me.
MR. BOVO: They can be cited, but they can't be arrested.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. BOVO: The United States Supreme Court said that these are petty
crimes. And felonies are crimes of probable cause.
THE COURT: Okay, I read your memorandum. Thank you. The court is
going to find Mr. Bovo guilty of.
(see trial transcript p. 104, 10-25)
According to Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 77-7-2 Police Officers
may make a warrantless arrest: (1) for any public offense committed or
attempted in the presence of any peace officer; "presence" includes all of the
physical senses or any device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range
of any physical sense, or records the observations of any of the physical
senses; (2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony or a class A
misdemeanor has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that
the person arrested has committed it; (3) when he has reasonable cause to
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believe the person has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable
cause for believing the person may;
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another
person.
This rule shows that the trial judge erred because he doesn't fully
understand the law. In the case at hand Mr. Bovo was charged with two
offenses; Class B misdemeanor, and Class C misdemeanor. Officer
Bingham testified in court that neither offense occurred in his presence. The
arresting officer wasn't allowed to testify. Both officers did not see, hear,
touch, taste, or feel either offense be committed. Had these offenses been
Class A misdemeanors or felonies the Officers could have claimed
"probable cause." The trial Judge does not understand that if a Class B or
Class C misdemeanor allegedly occurs out of the presence of the officer that
person cannot be arrested according to Utah law. That person can be cited
and charged under "reasonable suspicion," but arrest is unwarranted.
Reckless driving is covered in one of the most worded statues in the Vehicle
Code. This offense is a "discretionary arrest" misdemeanor, based on the
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observations of the citing officer. The misdemeanor arrest rule in Utah
provides that a police officer may make a warrantless arrest for a
misdemeanor offense if the misdemeanor is committed in the officer's
presence. This rule does not apply when a motor vehicle accident has
occurred. No accident or injury occurred in this situation. The purpose of
the presence requirement is to prevent warrantless arrests based on
information from third parties. State v. Jensen, 351 N. W. 2d 29 (Minn.
App. 1984). In ascertaining whether an offense is being committed in an
officer's presence, the officer may take into account what the officer
observes through use of any of his or her senses. State v. Forsythe 194
W.Va. 496,460 S.E.2d 194, 197-98 Ct. App 1985). The officer is not limited
to his sense of vision alone, i.e., it is not necessary for the officer to have
actually seen every fact constituting the commission of the misdemeanor,
but he may utilize all of his senses.. ..thus a misdemeanor is committed in
the presence of an officer when, with the aid of all his senses and what is
common knowledge under the circumstances, the officer has knowledge that
such is the case. Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1 (c), at 23-24
(3d.ed.1996). The city prosecutor argued that the offense did occur in the
officer's presence when the officers witnessed the reaction of the
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complainant. Theoretically the complainants could have been reacting to
anything, the space shuttle, a herd of elephants. Again, the purpose of the
presence requirement is to prevent warrantless arrests based on information
from third parties. Not only must the officer perceive through his or her
senses that an offense is being committed by the suspect, but the officer
must also have a reasonable ground to infer that the suspect is committing an
unlawful act to meet the probable cause requirement. Probable cause to
justify a misdemeanor arrest exists when the facts and circumstances as
observed by the officer through the officer's senses are sufficient to warrant
an officer of reasonable caution to believe that an offense is occurring.
Warren, 103 N. M. at 475-76, 709 P2d. at 197-98. (noting use of officer's
"sensory perceptions" to meet the "in presence" requirement). Although,
Officer Bingham witnessed the defendant vehicle travel approximately one
mile, he did not witness a single moving violation, infraction or
misdemeanor, nor did any other Orem City Police Officer. Thus, the stop
which Officer Bingham made was an investigatory stop; therefore, probable
cause for stopping is the issue, and Officer Bingham had no "probable
cause" witnessed in his presence to warrant an investigatory stop and Officer
Healy had no probable cause to make the arrest. Furthermore, no officer
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testified that the alleged threat occurred in his presence. The officers did
report that they based their findings on the third part complainants
testimony. Finally, the prosecutor has not presented any evidence to fulfill
the requirements of U.C.C.P. 77-7-2 (3) a,b,or c. The defendant did not
(a)flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest, the defendant did not (b) destroy
or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or (C) injure another
person or damage property belonging to another person. Defendant argues
that he was charged under Section 76-9-102, Utah Code Annotated (1973),
Disorderly Conduct. However subsection 76-9-102 (3) states, disorderly
conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the offense continues after a request
bv a person to desist. Otherwise it is an infraction." No person requested
the Defendant to desist, neither the officer nor the witness. Furthermore, this
alleged offense was "mouthed", meaning that all parties, complainant and
the officers, did not hear anything.
The defendant claims that he is charged with two offenses that are
classified by the U.S. Supreme Court as petty crimes. Mr. Bovo was
charged with Disorderly Conduct a class C Misdemeanor in violation of
section 76-9-102 of the Utah Code. The alleged crime was a threat
"mouthed", by the defendant. Because it is nearly impossible to prove
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beyond a reasonable doubt words that aren't spoken but motioned by a
complete stranger, the charges should be reversed. Both witnesses that
testified against Mr. Bovo proved that words can not be "lip read"
accurately.
MS. CALL: You're going to pay (transcript p.33,15-21).
MS.LENHARDT: You'll pay (transcript p.38,17-18).
O. BINGHAM: No, not a word. Nope" (transcript p.68,19).
O.HEALY: did not testify.
Further, if Mr. Bovo had yelled the phrase, "You're going to
pay, or even, You'll pay," and both officers and witnesses heard it, then
asked him to stop, but he yelled it again, would that still constitute crime the
crime he was charged with? Would a normal person perceive that as a
threat? A misdemeanor crime under Utah Code? No.
The arresting officer based his findings on a third party for an
infraction, not even a misdemeanor, and then arrested him for that infraction.
Under Section 77-17-3 the defendant argues that there is not sufficient
evidence to put a defendant to his defense, therefore, this court should order
the charges reversed. The trial record shows: (1) no person asked the
defendant to desist therefore it cannot be a misdemeanor, (2) the alleged
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offenses occurred out of the presence of the officers therefore the arrest was
unjustified, (3) the alleged threat was not audibly heard by anyone, (4) no
one testified that Mr. Bovo verbally threatened anyone, (5) the complainants
testified that the defendant mouthed two different comments. Proving that
the defendant "mouthed" a comment beyond a reasonable doubt is
impossible. (6) Even if the alleged words were in fact spoken and Mr. Bovo
was asked to stop, then he did it again, that phrase is not a threat to do bodily
harm and is therefore not a crime.
Thus, the judge erred when he ruled that an arrest can be made out of
the presence of the officers. Therefore, there was no justifiable reason to
make the arrest, nor hold the defendant up to the charges.
Issue IV

THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED WHEN HE BASED HIS
RULING ON THE TESTIMONY THAT THE JUDGE
HIMSELF HAD PROVIDED IN BEHALF OF THE
EXCUSED WITNESS, OFFICER HEALY.

The trial court erred when the judge stated the following during the
judgment.
THE COURT: The testimony also was that the officers had to ask him more
than once to comply with fairly simple commands, like can we see your
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driver's license, the original, and would you move to the back of this
vehicle, please. And he would not do that,
(trial transcripts p. 106, 8-12)
The prosecuting attorney questioned Officer Bingham, the following
testimony is found;
MS. JENSEN: When you returned toward the defendant was standing, did
you ask him why he gave you a photocopy of his license?
OFFICER BINGHAM: I did. At what point, I did ask him. I'm not entirely
sure which point that was.
MS. JENSEN: What did he say to you?
OFFICER BINGHAM: He told me that it was more convenient to use a
photocopied version of his driver's license, than it was to use the real
version of his driver's license.
MS. JENSEN: Did he ever give you his real license?
OFFICER BINGHAM: I did. I asked him if he had his original copy, at
which time he produced it out of his front pocket,
(trial transcript p.51, 8-18)
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The testimony speaking in behalf of Officer Healy was offered by Ms.
Jensen, the prosecuting attorney, was the testimony used by the trial judge
used in the ruling.
MR. CHURCH: Ms. Jensen has informed me the only additional testimony
would be - well, go ahead.
MS. JENSEN: That Officer Healy asked the defendant for a driver's license
and he said he didn't have one, but then he later produced it. So that's all.
THE COURT: Well, I'll excuse both officers, then.
(trial transcript p.73,21-24)
At the time Officer Healy asked Mr. Bovo for his driver's license
Officer Bingham was running checks with that license. Mr. Bovo told
Officer Healy that he didn't have his license because Officer Bingham had
it, but Officer Healy reported that Mr. Bovo stated he didn't have the license
and was searched and then a license was found on him. Completely on the
contrary, Officer Bingham stated (as indicated above) that when Mr. Bovo
was commanded to give the officer his real license Mr. Bovo, "produced it
out of hisfrontpocket," (trial transcript p.51,18). Both officers have
completely different recollections as indicated by their reports. Again if the
trial judge had allowed Mr. Bovo to question Officer Healy the discrepancy
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of "failing to comply to the officers orders," could have been clarified.
Instead the trial judge used the substitute testimony from the prosecuting
attorney to rule against the defendant, once again in violation of Rule 605 of
Utah Rules of Evidence. Clearly, the defendant was subject to impartiality,
and bias—judicial misconduct.

Issue V

THE TRIAL JUDGE EXPRESSED BIAS AND
PREJUDICE TOWARDS THE DEFENDANT IN OPEN
COURT THAT SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTED HIS
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL. THE
JUDGE REPEATEDLY CUT OFF THE DEFENDANT,
ALLOWED THE PROCECUTOR TO OBJECT AT
WILL. AND DENIED MR. BOVO'S LINE OF
QUESTIONING FOR NO APPARENT REASON.

In this case, for whatever reason, Mr. Bovo was not prosecuted but
persecuted. He was proceeding pro se, and granted his limited legal
knowledge bore evident early on, but he was subject to extremely impolite
and excessive decree by the judge and prosecuting attorney. The following
testimony can be found:
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MR. BOVO: Did you see any other units pass by the scene?
O. BINGHAM: It is possible that other units drove by. However, they did
not stop. That's of no consequence.
MR. BOVO: Did you see other units pass by?
MS. JENSEN: Objection, you Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. BOVO: Have you ever fabricated information to—
MS. JENSEN: Sustained.
THE COURT: No, wait a second. Sustained.
(trial transcript p.64, 14-p.65, 1)
Utah Rules of Evidence 607 states, "The credibility of a witness may
be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness. The two
officers' reports had discrepancies and Mr. Bovo was attempting to resolve
those discrepancies. Also he did not give any reason for the denying the line
Mr. Bovo asked a simple question, "Have you ever fabricated information?"
It was not a malicious or bizarre question. It was simple, so simple that the
officer couldn't help but respond, but the trial Judge did not allow Mr. Bovo
to ask simple questions. Mr. Bovo was extremely intimidated when he was
stopped by the officers and then witnessed four other officers drive by the
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scene all looking intently at him. Mr. Bovo felt swooped down by the
officers and felt very threatened. Officer Bingham's and Officer Healy's
reports of the incident vary considerably.
In Mr. Bovo's closing argument the judge repeatedly interrupted Mr.
Bovo in an effort to end the trial.
MR. BOVO: This complainant even testified that I did not say anything.
THE COURT: all right. Thank you, Mr. Bovo.
MR. BOVO: I'm almost done,
(trial transcript p. 103,20-23)
MR. BOVO: The United States Supreme Court said that these are petty
crimes. And felonies are crimes of probable cause
THE COURT: Okay, I read your memorandum. Thank you. The Court is
going to find Mr. Bovo Guilty of.
(trial transcript p. 104,20-25)
This is only a few instances where the trial judge interrupted Mr.
Bovo in the middle of his argument. Mr. Bovo hadn't yet finished his
closing argument when the judge decided to rule. Mr. Bovo asserts that the
trial court's denial of his demand for jury trial deprived him of that basic
Sixth Amendment constitutional right.
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Issue VI

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
MOTION TO SUPRESS STATEMENTS UNDER
MIRANDA 18 USCS $3501.

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to rule on this matter
because the trial judge denied line of questioning based on the Motion to
Dismiss filed by the defendant with the trial court (trial p.63, 8-15).
The officers attest that an alleged threat occurred while Mr. Bovo was
standing outside of his vehicle after he had been interrogated by two
officers. While those same two officers were investigating a crime other
than the reckless driving, they reported a second crime—Disorderly Conduct
occurred while Mr. Bovo was in custody.
Defendant argues that both his statements and the evidence relating to
the charges should be suppressed under Miranda, 18 USCS §3501 (c).
Miranda requires (1) that before interrogation, the person in custody must be
informed clearly that he has the right to remain silent and that anything he
says will be used against him in court; (2) that the person in custody must be
informed clearly of the right to consult with a lawyer and have one present
during interrogation; and (3) that a lawyer will be appointed for the person in
custody if he is not able to afford to pay a lawyer. The District Attorney
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acknowledges that Defendant was not informed of his right to remain silent
at all.
The issue the defendant raises is whether the officers were
investigating a crime other than just the traffic stop, if so a Miranda warning
would be required.
(A) The prosecutor argued in his Motion to Object that the
United States Supreme Court stated in Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9
(1988) that persons temporarily detained pursuant to a traffic stop are not in
custody for the purposes of Miranda and are not entitled to a Miranda
warning. ID. At 10, Berkemer v. MeCarty, U.S.420 (1984). The Court
reasoned that this was because traffic stops are brief and often occur in the
public view. Therefore, Defendant was not "in custody" and entitled to a
Miranda warning until formally placed under arrest. The U.S. Supreme
Court also ruled, A Police officer does not have to give me a Miranda
warning if he stops someone and detains them "in custody" for a traffic
violation so long as the police officer simply asks a motorist for
identification and limits discussion to the traffic offense for which the officer
stopped the motorist. A motorist's statement to a police officer relating to
events leading up to a ticket is therefore admissible even if the officer did
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not give the motorist the Miranda warning. However, a Miranda warning
would be required if an officer detains a motorist in order to question the
motorist about crimes unrelated to the traffic stop. Officer Healey stated in
his report and I quote, "she was extremely upset for what he had said to her
and she was even more afraid that he was going to try and get back at her in
some way. "I informed her that I would speak to him about contacting her"
(see Motion to Dismiss).
It is a third degree felony if a person communicates to a person a
threat because of any act performed or to be performed by the person in his
capacity as a witness or information in an official proceeding of
investigation. U.C.A. § 76-8-508 (2). Officer Healy speaking to me about
contacting her has nothing whatsoever with the traffic stop. It is a separate
crime completely, in fact, in the U.C.A. it is Section 76-8-508(2). Because
this is a crime which Officer Healey has "reasonable suspicion" to believe
will occur, Officer Healy must give a Miranda warning, the moment he
begins investigating the crime if he intends to use any of the information
gathered, in the interest of justice. Officer Healy reported that the Class C
misdemeanor Disorderly Conduct occurred whiled he was investigating the
threat.
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(B) Without Miranda or §3501, the court would look at the totality of
the circumstances as in Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963).
Further while §3501 (c) applies, §3501 itself should not trump Miranda as
the government argues. Miranda set out as a matter of Constitutional law
the procedure that must be followed for a confession to be held valid. Both
the majority and the dissent (Clark) agree that the decision in Miranda rests
on the Fifth Amendment. For the majority, Chief Justice Warren wrote,
"We have concluded that without proper safeguards the
process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or
accused or crime contains inherently compelling pressures
which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to
compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full
opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination,
the accused must be adequately and effectively appraised of his
rights and the exercise for those rights must be fully honored."
Miranda v. Arizona, 344 U. S. 436,-(1966).
The court would be advised to look at the words of U.S. Attorney
Janet Reno and Solicitor General Seth Waxman: "Because the Miranda
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decision is of constitutional dimension, Congress may not legislate a
contrary rule unless the Court was to overrule Miranda. We submit that
principals of stare decisis do not favor the overruling of Miranda, and we do
not request the Court to take that step. In the thirty-six years since that
decision was handed down, it has become embedded in the law and defined
thru the decisions of this Court. If Miranda were to be overruled, this Court
[the Supreme Court] would have to disavow a long line of its cases..." This
isfromthe Brief for the United States, filed Feb. 28, 2000, in the case of
Dickersonv. United States, No. 99-5525, page 9.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this court should correct the trial court's
abuse of discretion and error. This court should reverse, and remand. The
court should order the information dismissed.
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ADDENDUM
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I, TODD BOVO, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered an
original and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals,
450 South State, 5th Floor, P.O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City Utah 841140230; two copies to Robert J. Church, 56 North State Street, Orem Utah
84057, this

~^?Q day of January 2003.

DELIEVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Office of the
City Prosecutor this

^.<Q

day of
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Prosecutor

Defendant present ( / ) pro se
( ) with counsel
Defendant given information ( S ) Read
(
) Reading Waived.
( V ^ ) Advised of Rights and Penalties
Defendant acknowledged (s) he understands rights and penalties. (
) Given 2nd and 3rd Offense Warning in Open Court.
COUNSEL APPOINTED. SEE REVERSE SIDE. (
) Request for counsel denied.
RELEASE DEFENDANT ROR.
(
) Defendant in custody of (
) Sheriff
(
)OPD (
) Other
BAIL SET AT $
Cash / Bond / Surety.
(
) Remand into custody of
Defendant failed to appear.
(
) Warrant with bail at $
Cash / Bond / Surety.
Non-Bailable Warrant in Aid of Commitment for
days / months. Review after
days.
( ) No Review
FORFEIT BAIL BOND. (
) FORFEIT CASH BAIL. (
) FORFEIT IN DISPOSITION. ( ) FORFEIT FOR FTA. ( ) SODC
Defendant found Non-Compliant. Probation is revoked and terminated
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entered by
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) defendant

(

Plea A L )
Plea N<5
Plea
) defense counsel (

NOT Ol COUNT4
»
COUNTS
COUNT 6
) court (
) accepted after factual basis given.

U

1-800-642-3511

Plea
Plea
Plea

ENPINg;
) Defense waived right to timely imposition of sentence. (
) Defendant requested time for EOP / Sentence
Suspended
Imposed
Imposed
Suspended
days
JT 1 Fine of _
. and jail of
/
days
IT 2 Fine of _
. and jail of
days
IT 3 Fine of _
. and jail of
days
JT 4 Fine of
and jail of
SUSPENSIONS ARE CONTINGENT UPON DEFENDANTS COMPLIANCE WITH THIS ORDER
(
) Credit for time served
FINE and FEES PLUS INTERESTdue by
RESTITUTION due by
.(
) Court reserves jurisdiction regarding restitution.
and fees to be paid
(
) to the clerk of court
(
) as directed by Adult Probation.
. and continuing until paid in full.
Defendant to make monthly payments of $
beginning

IABQH

SEE REVERSE SIPE

months (
i Defendant is on probation for
i Report to Adult Probation for Pre-Sentence Report by
CALL INTERVENTION WITHIN 24 HOURS OF SENTENCING

HPL/DRUG TREATMENT

) Unsupervised

(

(

) Intervention

(

)AP&P

) GO TO POLICE DEPARTMENT FOR PROCESSING

SEE REVERSE SIDE

Defendant is ordered to pay $
Alcohol Education Fee b y .
BAC
Defendant is ORDERED TO TAKE THIS FORM and REPORT to the UTAH COUNTY DIVISION OF HUMAN SERVICES.
Complete Alcohol / Substance Abuse / Domestic Violence Evaluation by
Anger Management Class through UVSC (764-7580)
(
) Life Skills Class through UVSC
(
) Contact DCFS (374-7898)
Provide proof of completion to court (
) Continue present counseling (
) Treatment as Ordered (
) Court reserves jurisdiction over treatment
Pay Utah County Division of Human Services directly for evaluation / classes / Alcohol Education Fee.
STATE FUND to pay for evaluation / classes
iantto (
) have no drug / alcohol related charges (
) use no alcohol or controlled substances (
) submit to blood / urine / drug / alcohol tests.
(
) Not associate with anyone using controlled substance or paraphernalia
»RDER: (Call Within One Week To Schedule Jail Time!.
Report to the UTAH COUNTY JAIL and serve
days by
Work Diversion Program (
) Work Release. (
) Work Search.
. Days Home Confinement through INTERVENTION (SEE REVERSE SIDE).
To be completed by
in
hours increments. Defendant Phone #
>e served (
) CONCURRENT (
) CONSECUTIVE TO ANY OTHER CASE. Defendant to provide proof of completion.

WITY SERVICE

SEE REVERSE SIDE

. hours in lieu of fine / jail by_
Community service granted. Defendant to complete.
Go to counter for referral. Defendant to provide proof of completion. (
) Serve Through United Way - 374-2588
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MO CONTACT WITH VICTIMS

PROTECTIVE ORDER SERVED ON DEFENDANT

JG SCHEDULE IN OPEN Cpj
BY PROMISE
PROMI! TO APPE
irrest.
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hearing. I realize that if I fail to appear, the Court may-proceed in my absence and a warrant may issue

DATE FILED
ARR. DATE

5-21-02
Summons

F O U R T H D I S T R I C T COURT, S T A T E OF UTAH
U T A H C O U N T Y , C I T Y OF O R E M D E P A R T M E N T

CITY OF OREM,

INFORMATION
Plaintiff,

vs.
Todd Frank Bovo
420 East 400 South
Provo, UT

Case No.

tfl&U>

M ^ 7 ^ +

Defendant
DOB: 10-22-73

OTNNo.

The undersigned Officer under oath states on information and belief that the defendant committed the crime(s) of:
RECKLESS DRIVING, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 41 -6-45 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953,
as amended), which the City of Orem has adopted by Section 19-1-1, Orem City Code (as amended), in that on or
about April 6,2002, in Orem, Utah County, Utah, the defendant did drive a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for
the safety of persons or property.
DISORDERLY CONDUCT, a Class C Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 76-9-102, Utah Code Annotated (1973,
as amended), which the City of Orem has adopted by Section 9-1 -1, Orem City Code (as amended), in that on or about
April 6,2002, in Orem, Utah County, Utah, the defendant, intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or
alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, did engage in fightingw in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior.
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses:
Officer S. Healy
Orem Department of Public Safety

1*JL$JL
Prosecutor

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT- OREM COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OREM CITY,
PLANTIFF

vs.
CASE No. 025204324 TC
TODD FRANK BOVO,
DEFENDANT

DEFENDANTS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION
Defendant Todd F. Bovo charges should be dismissed based on the totality of the
circumstances. The government has charged the defendant in violation of Section 41-6-45
Reckless driving. This charge is clearly wrong because this is a subjective offense, based
on the discretion of the citing officer, and not based on hearsay evidence. Only when a
police officer observes a violation of a misdemeanor (or an infraction) is he or she
empowered to make an arrest People v. Superior Court 7 Cal.3d. 186,200 (1972). The
alleged offenses were observed solely by the complainant, and no officer witnessed a

single moving violation. Such a case can be made in the event of personal injury or
property damage, however, neither occurred in this situation. Todd was also charged
under Section 76-9-102, Utah Code Annotated (1973), Disorderly Conduct. However,
subsection 76-9-102 (3) states, "disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the
offense continues after a request by a person to desist. Otherwise it is an infraction." No
person requested the defendant to desist. Also, the arresting officer failed to ascertain
whether the offense was committed in his presence, so as to justify a warrantless arrest.
The officer did not observe the alleged offense through the use of any of his own senses,
and based hisfindingson that of the witness on scene. Although probable cause is
justified in felony charges, misdemeanor "probably cause" or "probable suspicion" exists
when the facts and circumstances are observed by the officer through the officer's senses
and are sufficient to warrant an officer of reasonable caution to believe that an offense is
occurring. Also, the government failed to comply with Miranda v. Arizona^ 344 U.S. 436
(1966). All statements should be suppressed because of the violation of the Fifth
Amendment Due to the preponderance and lack of credible evidence both charges should
be dismissed.

DECLARATION
1. Todd F. Bovo is the defendant in the above-entitled action.
2. At about 18:45 hours, April 6,2002, Defendant was stopped at 100 North after being
followed by officers for approximately a mile.
3. While driving, he was accompanied by my brother ADAM A. BOVO who would have
been able to testify on my behalf to the alleged incident, however, he is currently
employed as a forest firefighter on a "Hot Shot" crew and is unable to be contacted due to
the remote locations where he works. Also,ridingas a passenger was TROY L. BOVO,
army first class, and UVSC student. Lastly, Zesty, a pure-bred-yellow-Labrador was
being carried in the vehicle. Zesty is owned by Guide Dogs for the Blind in San Rafel

California. Todd is a volunteer in the program to train Zesty of the basic commands to
guide a blind person. At the time of the incident Zesty was wearing her identifying green
jacket as she always does whenever she accompanies him in public places.
4. At the time of the traffic stop the defendant was ordered out of the vehicle because
officers believed he may try to flee the stop. This was not a one-officer arrest. He was
swooped down upon by a combined team of at least six officers. This intimidating team
came armed not only with guns, but also with other signs of power. This defendant, for
whom there is no indication of prior experience with police or with the criminal justice
system was held incommunicado at which time he was subjected to isolation,
interrogation, alternating threats, by confrontational abusive officers.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Argument
Defendant argues that both the evidence and the statements relating to the charges should
be dismissed under the totality of the circumstances.
I. RECKLESS DRIVING, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 41-6-45 of the
Utah Code Annotated (1953), which the City of Orem has adopted by Section 19-1-1, in
that, the defendant did drive a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of
persons or property. The most serious of all driving-related misdemeanors. Reckless
driving is covered in one of the most worded statues in the Vehicle Code. This offense is
a "discretionary arrest" misdemeanor, based on the observations of the citing officer.
The misdemeanor arrest rule in Utah provides that a police officer may make a
warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor offense if the misdemeanor is committed in the
officer's presence. This rule does not apply when a motor vehicle accident has occurred.
No accident or injury occurred in this situation. The purpose of the presence
requirement is to prevent warrantless arrests based on information from third parties.
State v. Jensen, 351N. W. 2d 29 (Minn. App. 1984). In ascertaining whether an offense

that before interrogation, the person in custody must be informed clearly that he has the
right to remain silent and that anything he says will be used against him in court; (2) that
the person in custody must be informed clearly of therightto consult with a lawyer and
have one present during interrogation; and (3) that a lawyer will be appointed for the
person in custody if he is not able to afford to pay a lawyer. The District Attorney
acknowledges that Defendant was not informed of hisrightto remain silent until after his
statements. A Police officer does not have to give me a Miranda warning if he stops
someone for a traffic violation so long as the police officer simply asks a motorist for
identification and limits discussion to the traffic offense for which the officer stopped the
motorist. A motorist's statement to a police officer relating to events leading up to a
ticket is therefore admissible even if the officer did not give the motorist the Miranda
warning. However, a Miranda warning would be required if an officer detains a motorist
in order to question the motorist about crimes unrelated to the traffic stop. Officer
Healey was stated he was talking with the complaintant to investigate the defendant
contacting her in the future, with harassment or threats.

Without Miranda or §3501, the court would look at the totality of the circumstances as in
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503,514 (1963). In the case before the court today, Mr.
Todd F. Bovo is a man with no previous history with the criminal justice system. He did
sound his horn and flash his lights to another motorist who was driving well below the
speed limit while talking on her cell phone and she was clearly not paying attention to
driving her vehicle. He did not violate any driving rules. Upon being dispatched officers
surrounded the defendant with numerous officers, whereas the defendant was isolated and
threatened. The arresting Officer Healy stated, "I am going to teach you a lesson because
you are messing with the wrong cop-1 win every time." Also, "I don't care who you are I
can ruin your day if I want to.*'

Further while §3501 (c) applies, §3501 itself should not trump Miranda as the
government argues. Miranda set out as a matter of Constitutional law the procedure that
must be followed for a confession to be held valid Both the majority and the dissent

is being committed in an officer's presence, the officer may take into account what the
officer observes through use of any of his or her senses, State v. Forsythe 194 W.V&
496,460 S.E.2d 194,197-98 Ct App 1985). The officer is not limited to his sense of
vision alone, i.e., it is not necessary for the officer to have actually seen every fact
constituting the commission of the misdemeanor, but he may utilize all of his
senses... .thus a misdemeanor is committed in the presence of an officer when, with the
aid of all his senses and what is common knowledge under the circumstances, the officer
has knowledge that such is the case. Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1 ©, at
23-24 (3d.ed. 1996). Not only must the officer perceive through his or her senses that an
offense is being committed, but the officer must also have a reasonable ground to infer
that the suspect is committing an unlawful act to meet the probable cause requirement
Probable cause to justify a misdemeanor arrest exists when the fects and circumstances as
observed by the officer through the officer's senses are sufficient to warrant an officer of
reasonable caution to believe that an offense is occurring. Warren, 103 N. M. at 475-76,
709 P2d. at 197-98. (noting use of officer's "sensory perceptions" to meet the 'In
presence" requirement). Although, Officer Bingham witnessed the defendant vehicle
travel approximately one mile, he did not witness a single moving violation, infraction or
misdemeanor, nor did any other Orem City Police Officer. Thus, the stop which Officer
Bingham made was an investigatory stop; therefore, probable cause for stopping is the
issue, and Officer Bingham had no "probable cause" witnessed in his presence to warrant
an investigatory stop. Lastly, this charge is incorrect because two of the alleged moving
violations are not found under Title 41, chapter six as the law states, "following another
vehicle—safe distance, does not apply to vehicle speeds of less than 35 miles per hour."
The witness testified in her statement that she was traveling 25 miles an hour and the
defendant was behind her the whole time. Defendant argues a lack of reasonable
grounds to stop him. Where there are unreasonable grounds supporting a warrantless
arrest for the commission of a misdemeanor, the arrest is not valid, and is therefore a
violation of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure.

II. Defendant argues that both his statements and the evidence relating to the charges
should be suppressed under Miranda, under 18 USCS §3501 (c). Miranda requires (1)

(Clark) agree that the decision in Miranda, rests on the Fifth, Amendment I or (he
majority, Chief Justice Warn"
We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of
in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused or crime contains
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's
will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do
so freely. In, order to combat these pressure's and to permit a f iill
opportunity to exercise the prh ilege against self-incrimination, the
accused must be adequately and effectively appraised of hisrightsand the
exercise for thoserightsmust be fully honored." Miranda v. Arizona, 344
U. S. 436,~(1966).

Solicitor General Seth Waxman: "Because the Miranda decision is of constitional
dimension, Congress may not legislate a contrary rule unless the Court was to overrule
Miranda, We submit that principals of stare decisis do not favor the overruling of
Miranda, and we do not request the Court to take that step. In the thirty-six years since
that decision was'handed down, it has become embedded in the km and defined thin the
decisions of this Court If Miranda were lo he overruled this Court [the Supreme Court]
would have to disavow a long line of its cases ' ' I 'his isfromthe Brief for the United
States,filedFeb. 28,2000, in the case of'Dickersom v. I hited Stated, No, 99-5525, page
9.
To 'date no United States Attorney General has argued that \ limmia r. inn itn u\\
land Congress dws not haui tin1 power to overrule a Supreme Court opinion I'hal "s
why §3501 has been ignored since its passage two years after Miranda.
Defendant argues that he was charged under Section 76-9-102, Utah Code Annotated
(1973), Disorderly Conduct. However subsection, 76-9-10,2 (3) states, disorderly conduct
is a class C misdemeanor if the offense continues after a request by a person to desist
Otherwise it is an infract ion." No person requested the Defendant to desist, the officer

nor the witness Furthermore, this alleged offense was 'mouthed", meaning that all!
parties, complainant aiitJ flit1 officer; did not hear anything Only (he complainant stated
thai she saw tht' dciefidanii mouth a threat i Whcer Heaiy and Officer Bingham did not
hear or see any threatening behavior by the defendant. Thus, once again the arresting
officer based his findings on a third party for an infraction, not even a misdemeanor.
Under Section 77-17-3 the defendant argues that there is not sufficient evidence to put a
defendant to his defense:, therefore, the court should ordei him discharged hovinp thai
the defendant "mouthed" a comment beyond a reasonable doubt is impossible.

CQNCIVSIQN

j ears. His duties included responding to local emergencies while operating an
ambulance. Also, this time last year he provided emergency care for one of the
largest correctional facilities in the State of California. He worked with law officers
on a daily basis without incident, ever. He returned to Utah on a leave of absence to
finish class work at B Yll While in Utah he encounters d Officer Heal) i ho
p esented himself very unprofessionally. He was confrontational, disrespectful,
threatening, and rude Officer Healy has a history of overbearing force, and
demonstrated his character during this incident
For the reasons set forth above, the court should be ordered to dismiss the matter
rather than try the defendant. The evidence is insufficient to support a conviction It
would not be in the interest of \mtnv in prolong these miittu<i
DATED

Respectfully submitted,

1 will Hovo Defendant in Pro Per

